Terrorism and IT: cyberterrorism and terrorist organisations online by Conway, Maura
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Terrorism and IT:  
Cyberterrorism and Terrorist Organisations Online1 
 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual 
International Convention, Portland, Oregon, USA, 25 February to 1 March, 2003. 
 
 
Maura Conway 
 
Department of Political Science 
1, College Green 
Trinity College 
Dublin 2 
Ireland 
 
conwaym@tcd.ie 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Analysts have been saying for some time now that the 'new terrorism' depends on the 
information revolution and its technologies. 
 
Indeed, terrorism has long been about ‘information’ -- from the fact that trainees for suicide 
bombings are kept from listening to international media, through the ways that terrorists seek to 
create disasters that will consume the front pages, to the related debates about countermeasures 
that would limit freedom of the press, increase public surveillance and intelligence gathering, and 
heighten security over information and communications systems. Terrorist tactics focus attention 
on the importance of information and communications for the functioning of democratic 
institutions; debates about how terrorist threats undermine democratic practices may revolve 
around freedom of information issues" (Arquilla et al. 1999, 72; see also Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
2001). 
 
Of course, the increase in information, communication, and communication technologies 
is not simply impacting terrorist groups. Information is the new lifeblood of the 
international system. World politics today transcends simple international relations, and 
much of the change has taken place as a result of the spread of information infrastructures 
(Luke 2001, 113). The information revolution is driving dramatic changes in political, 
diplomatic, military, economic, social, and cultural affairs. In the second half of the 
twentieth century, economically advanced countries made the shift into what has been 
                                                 
1
 This paper is a reworking of two previously published articles (see Conway 2002a and 2002b). The 
research on which the paper is based was supported by a grant from the Irish Research Council for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS).  
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termed the 'information society' or the 'information age.' The futurist Alvin Toffler (1980) 
has labeled this transition the 'Third Wave', suggesting that it will ultimately be as 
consequential as the two previous waves in human history: from hunter gatherer to 
agricultural societies, and from agricultural to industrial ones. The rapid expansion and 
diffusion of new International Communications Technologies (ICTs), particularly evident 
in the growth of the Internet, contribute to the set of phenomena collectively labeled 
globalization and cut across traditional temporal and spatial boundaries. 
 Every machine connected to the Internet is potentially a printing press, a 
broadcasting station, or a place of assembly. The ability to communicate words, images, 
and sounds, which underlies the power to persuade, inform, witness, debate, and discuss 
(not to mention the power to slander, propagandize, disseminate bad or misleading 
information, engage in misinformation and/or disinformation, etc.) is no longer the sole 
province of those who own or control printing presses, radio stations, or television 
networks. And in the twenty-first century, terrorists are availing of the opportunity to 
connect. 
 In particular, both sub-state and non-state actors are said to be harnessing -- or 
preparing to harness -- the power of the Internet to harass and attack their foes. In 
newspapers and magazines, in film and on television, 'cyberterrorism' is in the zeitgeist. 
The Internet is an ideal propaganda tool for terrorists: in the past they had to 
communicate through acts of violence and hope that those acts garnered sufficient 
attention to publicize the perpetrators cause or explain their ideological justification. With 
the advent of the Internet, however, the same groups can disseminate their information 
undiluted by the media and untouched by government sensors. In 1999 it was reported 
that 12 of the 30 terrorist groups deemed Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) by the 
United States Department of State had their own Web sites (McGirk, 1999).2 Today, a 
majority of the 33 groups on the same list have an online presence (see Conway 2002a, 
Table 1).3 But are terrorists who operate in cyberspace ‘cyberterrorists’? The answer 
hinges on what constitutes cyberterrorism.   
 
 
Defining and Redefining Cyberterrorism  
 
There are a number of stumbling blocks to constructing a clear and concise definition of 
cyberterrorism. First, a majority of the discussion of cyberterrorism has been conducted 
in the popular media, where the focus is on ratings and readership figures rather than 
establishing good operational definitions of new terms. Second, the term is subject to 
chronic misuse and overuse and since 9/11, in particular, has become a buzzword that can 
mean radically different things to different people. In addition, it has become common 
when dealing with computers and the Internet to create new words by placing the handle 
cyber, computer, or information before another word. This may appear to denote a 
                                                 
2
 On May 3, 2002, the European Union updated its list of prohibited organizations. See 
http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/misc/70413.pdf. The latest country to devise such a list is Canada. See 
http://www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/news/20020723_e.asp.  
3
 A comprehensive list of all terrorist Web sites is available on Barry Cromwell’s ‘Separatist, Para-Military, 
Military, Intelligence, and Political Organizations’ site at http://www.cromwell-
intl.com/security/netusers.html.  
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completely new phenomenon, but often it does not and confusion ensues. Finally, a major 
obstacle to creating a definition of cyberterrorism is the lack of an agreed-upon definition 
of terrorism (Embar-Seddon 2002, 1034). This does not mean that no acceptable 
definitions of cyberterrorism have been put forward. On the contrary, there are a number 
of well thought out definitions of the term available, and these are discussed below.4 
However, no single definition of cyberterrorism is agreed upon by all, in the same way 
that no single, globally accepted definition of classical political terrorism exists.  
 Barry Collin, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Intelligence 
in California, coined the term 'cyberterrorism' in the 1980s. The concept is composed of 
two elements: cyberspace and terrorism. Cyberspace may be conceived of as "that place 
in which computer programs function and data moves" (Collin, 1996). Terrorism is a less 
easily defined term. In fact, most scholarly texts devoted to the study of terrorism contain 
a section, chapter, or chapters devoted to a discussion of how difficult it is to define the 
term (see Gearty, 1991; Guelke, 1998; Hoffman, 1998; Schmid and Jongman, 1988; 
Wardlaw, 1982). This paper will employ the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 
of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the following 
definition: "The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience."5 
 Combining these definitions results in the construction of a narrowly drawn 
working definition of cyberterrorism as follows: "cyberterrorism refers to premeditated, 
politically motivated attacks by sub-national groups or clandestine agents against 
information, computer systems, computer programs, and data that result in violence 
against non-combatant targets" (Denning 1999, 2 & 27; Pollitt, n.d.). By this definition, 
sending pornographic e-mails to minors, posting offensive content on the Internet, 
defacing Web pages, stealing credit card information, posting credit card numbers on the 
Internet, and clandestinely redirecting Internet traffic from one site to another do not 
constitute instances of cyberterrorism, contrary to what local government authorities and 
the press have stated (see Conway 2002c). Admittedly, terrorism is a notoriously difficult 
concept to define; however, the addition of computers to old-fashioned criminality it is 
not.  
 The inflation of the concept of terrorism may increase newspaper circulation, but 
is ultimately not in the public interest. Despite this, many have suggested adopting 
broader definitions of the term. In a 1997 article in the journal Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Matthew Devost, Brian Houghton and Neal Pollard defined ‘information 
terrorism’ as “the intentional abuse of a digital information system, network or 
component toward an end that supports or facilitates a terrorist campaign or action” 
(1997, 75). They conceive of information terrorism as “the nexus between criminal 
information system fraud or abuse, and the physical violence of terrorism” (1996, 10; 
1997, 76). This allows for attacks that would not necessarily result in violence against 
humans-- although they might incite fear-- to be characterized as terrorist. But while there 
is no single accepted definition of terrorism, a majority of scholars agree that it has two 
                                                 
4
 One of the most accessible sound bites on what defines cyberterrorism is that it is ‘hacking with a body 
count’ (Collin, quoted in Ballard et al 2002, 992).  
5
 This is also the definition employed in the US State Department’s annual report Patterns of Global 
Terrorism.  
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integral components: the use of force or violence and a political motivation (Guelke 
1998, 19; Schmid & Jongman 1988, 5). Indeed, most domestic laws define classical or 
political terrorism as requiring violence or the threat to or the taking of human life for 
political or ideological ends. Devost, Houghton and Pollard are aware of this, but wish to 
allow for the inclusion of pure information system abuse (that does not employ nor result 
in physical violence) as a possible new facet of terrorism nonetheless (1996, 10). Others 
have followed their lead. 
Israel’s former science minister, Michael Eitan, has deemed “sabotage over the 
Internet” as cyberterrorism (Sher 2000). And according to the Japanese government, 
cyberterrorism aims at “seriously affecting information systems of private companies and 
government ministries and agencies by gaining illegal access to their computer networks 
and destroying data” (FBIS 2002b). A report by the Moscow-based ITAR-TASS news 
agency states that in Russia cyberterrorism is perceived as “the use of computer 
technologies for terrorist purposes” (FBIS 2002a). In 1999, a report by the Center for the 
Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CSTIW) at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California defined cyberterrorism as the “unlawful destruction or disruption of 
digital property to intimidate or coerce people” (Daukantas 2001). “We shall define 
cyberterrorism as any act of terrorism…that uses information systems or computer 
technology either as a weapon or a target,” stated a recent NATO brief, Technology and 
Terrorism (Mates 2001, 6).  Yael Shahar, Web master at the International Policy Institute 
for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), located in Herzliya, Israel, differentiates between many 
different types of what he prefers to call ‘information terrorism’: ‘electronic warfare’ 
occurs when hardware is the target, ‘psychological warfare’ is the goal of inflammatory 
content, and it is only ‘hacker warfare’, according to Shahar, that degenerates into 
cyberterrorism (Hershman 2000).  
John Leyden, writing in The Register, describes how a group of Palestinian 
hackers and sympathizers set up a Web site that provides one-stop access to hacking tools 
and viruses, and tips on how to use the tools to mount attacks on Israeli targets. 
According to Leyden, these hackers are using the techniques of cyberterrorism (Leyden 
2000). It is clear that Leyden and others wish to conflate politically motivated hacking-- 
so-called hacktivism-- and terrorism. Such unwarranted expansion of the concept of 
cyberterrorism runs contrary to the definitions outlined earlier. Advancing one step 
further, Johan J. Ingles-le Noble, writing in Jane’s Intelligence Review, had this to say: 
 
Cyberterrorism is not only about damaging systems but also about intelligence gathering. The 
intense focus on ‘shut-down-the-power-grid’ scenarios and tight analogies with physically violent 
techniques ignore other more potentially effective uses of IT in terrorist warfare: intelligence-
gathering, counter-intelligence and disinformation (1999, 6).  
 
Ingles-le Noble’s comments highlight the more potentially realistic and effective uses of 
the Internet by terrorist groups (i.e. intelligence-gathering, counter-intelligence, 
disinformation, etc.). However, he mistakenly labels these alternative uses 
‘cyberterrorism.’ Consider the November 2000 electronic attack carried out from 
Pakistan against the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a pro-Israeli 
lobbying group based in Washington, DC. The group’s site was defaced with anti-Israeli 
commentary. The attacker also stole some 3,500 e-mail addresses and 700 credit card 
numbers, sent anti-Israeli diatribes to the addresses, and published the credit card data on 
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the Internet. Dr. Nuker, the Pakistani hacker who claimed responsibility for the incident, 
said he was a founder of the Pakistani Hackerz Club, the aim of which was to “hack for 
the injustice going around the globe, especially with [sic] Muslims.” But even had Dr. 
Nuker broken into AIPAC’s headquarters and physically stolen the credit card 
information and e-mail addresses, this would not be considered an act of terrorism, but a 
criminal undertaking. It is only acting on the information obtained to perpetrate an attack 
in furtherance of some political aim that could be considered terrorist.  
Ingles-le Noble further contends that “disinformation is easily spread; rumors get 
picked up by the media, aided by the occasional anonymous e-mail.” That may be so, but 
spreading false information whether via word-of-mouth, the print or broadcast media, or 
some other medium, is oftentimes not even criminal, never mind terrorist. Why should 
things be any different in cyberspace? Ingles-le Noble (1999) himself recognizes that: 
 
There is undoubtedly a lot of exaggeration in this field. If your system goes down, it is a lot more 
interesting to say it was the work of a foreign government rather than admit it was due to an 
American teenage ‘script-kiddy’ tinkering with a badly written CGI script. If the power goes out, 
people light a candle and wait for it to return, but do not feel terrified. If their mobile phones 
switch off, society does not instantly feel under attack. If someone cracks a web site and changes 
the content, terror does not stalk the streets. 
 
Nonetheless, there is widespread concern that a catastrophic cyberterrorist attack is 
imminent, particularly in the wake of the events of 9/11. However, the bulk of the 
evidence to date shows that while terrorist groups are making widespread use of the 
Internet, so far they have not resorted to cyberterrorism, or shown the inclination to move 
heavily in that direction. Dramatic predictions to the contrary certainly make good copy, 
generate high ratings and sell many books and journals, but do not contribute to an 
intelligent, well-informed analysis of the threat of cyberterrorism.  
 
 
Distinguishing Characteristics 
 
When it comes to discussion of cyberterrorism, there are two basic areas in which 
clarification is needed. First, the confusion between cyberterrorism and cybercrime. Such 
confusion is partly caused by the lack of clear definitions of the two phenomena. A UN 
manual on IT-related crime recognizes that, even after several years of debate among 
experts on just what constitutes cybercrime and what cyberterrorism, "there is no 
internationally recognized definition of those terms" (Mates 2001). Second, it is useful to 
distinguish two different facets of terrorist use of information technology: terrorist use of 
computers as a facilitator of their activities, and terrorism involving computer technology 
as a weapon or target. Utilizing the definitions outlined above, it is possible to clarify 
both difficulties. Cybercrime and cyberterrorism are not coterminous. Cyberspace attacks 
must have a ‘terrorist’ component in order to be labeled cyberterrorism. The attacks must 
instill terror as commonly understood (that is, result in death and/or large-scale 
destruction), and they must have a political motivation. As regards the distinction 
between terrorist use of information technology (i.e. for the purposes of inter-group 
communication, propaganda, etc.) and terrorism involving computer technology as a 
weapon/target, only the latter may be defined as cyberterrorism. Terrorist ‘use’ of 
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computers as a facilitator of their activities, whether for propaganda, communication, or 
other purposes, is simply that: ‘use.’  
Kent Anderson6 has devised a three-tiered schema for categorizing fringe activity 
on the Internet, utilizing the terms ‘Use,’ ‘Misuse,’ and ‘Offensive Use.’ Anderson 
explains: 
 
Use is simply using the Internet/WWW to facilitate communications via e-mails and mailing lists, 
newsgroups and websites. In almost every case, this activity is simply free speech…Misuse is 
when the line is crossed from expression of ideas to acts that disrupt or otherwise compromise 
other sites. An example of misuse is Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against websites. In the 
physical world, most protests are allowed, however, [even] if the protests disrupt other functions 
of society such as train service or access to private property…The same should be true for online 
activity. Offensive use is the next level of activity where actual damage or theft occurs. The 
physical world analogy would be a riot where property is damaged or people are injured. An 
example of this type of activity online is the recent attack on systems belonging to the world 
economic forum, where personal information of high profile individuals was stolen 
(Weisenburger 2001, 2). 
 
Combining Anderson’s schema with the definition of cyberterrorism outlined above it is 
possible to construct a four-level scale of the uses of the Internet for political activism by 
unconventional actors, ranging from ‘Use’ at one end of the spectrum to ‘Cyberterrorism’ 
at the other (see Table 1). Unfortunately, such a schema has not generally been employed 
in the literature or in the legislative arena. This is particularly disquieting given that the 
vast majority of terrorist activity on the Internet is limited to ‘Use.’ 
 
 
Table 1. Typology of Cyber Activism and Cyber Attacks 
Action Definition Source Example 
Use Using the Internet to 
facilitate the 
expression of ideas and 
communication(s) 
Internet 
users 
Emails, mailing lists, 
newsgroups, websites 
Misuse Using the Internet to 
disrupt or compromise 
Web sites or 
infrastructure 
Hackers, 
Hacktivists 
Denial-of-Service 
(DoS) attacks 
Offensive Use Using the Internet to 
cause damage or 
engage in theft 
Crackers Stealing data 
(e.g. credit card 
details) 
Cyberterrorism An attack carried out by 
terrorists either via the 
Internet or targeting the 
Internet that results in 
violence against persons or 
severe economic damage 
Terrorists A terrorist group 
using the Internet to 
carry out a major 
assault on the New 
York Stock 
Exchange 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Anderson was formerly senior vice-president of IT Security and Investigations for information security 
firm Control Risks Group. 
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‘Use’ and ‘Misuse’: Some Empirical Observations 
 
Researchers are still unclear whether the ability to communicate online worldwide has 
resulted in an increase or a decrease in terrorist acts. It is agreed, however, that online 
activities substantially improve the ability of such terrorist groups to raise funds, lure new 
faithful, and reach a mass audience (Arquilla et al., 1999, p. 66; Piller, 2001). The most 
popular terrorist sites draw tens of thousands of visitors each month. 
Hizbollah,7 a Lebanese-based Shi'ite Islamic group, established their collection of 
Web sites in 1995. They currently manage three such sites: one for the Central Press 
Office,8 another to describe its attacks on Israeli targets,9 and the last Al Manar TV for 
news and information.10 All three may be viewed in either English or Arabic.11 The 
Central Press Office site contains an introduction to the group, press cuttings and 
statements, political declarations, and speeches of the group's Secretary General. One 
may also access a photo gallery, video and audio clips. The information contained in 
these pages is updated regularly. In the event that one would like to find out more, 
contact information, in the form of an e-mail address, is provided. In a similar vein, 
Hamas' Web site presents political cartoons, streaming video clips and photomontages 
depicting the violent deaths of Palestinian children.12 It has been claimed that the Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA), a fundamentalist sect warring with the Algerian government, 
posted a detailed bomb-making manual on their site.13 The online home of the Tamil 
Tigers (LTTE), a liberation army in Sri Lanka best known for the 1991 assassination of 
former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, offers position papers, daily news, an online 
store -- for sale are books and pamphlets, videos, audio tapes, CDs, a 2002 calendar, and 
the Tamil Eelam flag -- and free e-mail services. Other terrorist sites host electronic 
bulletin boards, post tips on smuggling money to finance their operations, and provide 
automated registration for e-mail alerts. 
Many terrorist group sites are hosted in the United States. For example, a 
Connecticut-based ISP was providing co-location and virtual hosting services for the 
Hamas site in data centers located in Connecticut and Chicago (Lyman, 2002). While 
sites such as that maintained by Hamas are likely to be subject to more intense scrutiny 
following the September attacks, similar Web sites were the subject of debate in the 
United States previous to the events of 11 September. In 1997 controversy erupted when 
it was revealed that the State University of New York (SUNY) at Binghamton was 
hosting the Web site of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and a 
Tupac Amaru (MRTA) solidarity site was operating out of the University of California at 
San Diego (UCSD). SUNY officials promptly shut down the FARC site. In San Diego it 
was decided to err on the side of free speech and the Tupac Amaru site remains in 
                                                 
7
 Also Hizballah, Hezbollah, Hezbullah, Hezbollah, etc., a.k.a Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice 
Organisation, Organisation of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine. 
8
 Online at http://www.hizbollah.org.  
9
 Accessible at http://www.moqawama.tv/.  
10
 Online at http://www.manartv.com.  
11
 In addition, see http://www.nasrollah.org the home page of Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, the General 
Secretary of Hizbollah, in Arabic, English, and French. 
12
 Accessible at http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/hamas/index.htm.  
13
 I have not, as yet, been able to locate the GIA site. 
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operation (Collier, 1997).14 It is not illegal to host such a site, even if a group is deemed 
an FTO by the United States Department of State, as long as a site is not seeking financial 
contributions nor providing financial support to the group. Other content is generally 
considered to be protected speech under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States (see also McCullagh 2002a & 2002b). 
It's not all plain sailing for these 'netizens', however. Their homepages have been 
subject to intermittent DoS and other hack attacks and there have also been strikes against 
their Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that have resulted in more permanent difficulties. 
In 1997, for example, an e-mail bombing was conducted against the Institute for Global 
Communications (IGC),15 a San Francisco-based ISP, hosting the Web pages of the 
Euskal Herria or Basque Country Journal, a publication edited by supporters of the 
Basque group Homeland and Liberty (ETA). The attacks against IGC commenced 
following the assassination by ETA of a popular town councilor in northern Spain. The 
protestors wanted the site pulled from the Internet. To accomplish this they bombarded 
IGC with thousands of spurious e-mails routed through hundreds of different mail relays, 
spammed IGC staff and customer accounts, clogged their Web page with bogus credit 
card orders, and threatened to employ the same tactics against other organizations using 
IGC services. IGC pulled the Euskal Herria site on 18 July 1997, but not before archiving 
a copy of the site enabling others to put up mirrors. Shortly thereafter, mirror sites 
appeared on half a dozen servers on three continents. Despite this, the protestors e-mail 
action raised fears of a new era of censorship imposed by direct action from anonymous 
hacktivists. Furthermore, approximately one month after IGC pulled the controversial site 
off its servers, Scotland Yard's Anti-Terrorist Squad shut down Internet Freedom's U.K. 
Web site for hosting the journal. Scotland Yard claimed to be acting against terrorism 
(Denning 1999, 20-21).16 
The so-called 'cyberwar' that raged between Israelis and Palestinians and their 
supporters in 2000 was a mere nuisance in comparison with such targeted and sustained 
campaigns. The Mideast 'cyberwar' began on November -- about three weeks after 
Hizbollah seized three Israeli soldiers on patrol in the Sheba'a Farms area of south 
Lebanon and held them for ransom -- when pro-Israeli hackers created a Web site to host 
FloodNet attacks. Within days, Hizbollah's site was flooded by millions of 'pings' -- the 
cyber-equivalent of knocks on the door -- and crashed. Hezbollah then tried reviving the 
site under slightly different spellings, but they too came under sustained attack. In all, six 
different Hizbollah sites, the Hamas site, and other Palestinian informational sites were 
victims of the FloodNet device (Gentile, 2000a, 2000b; Hockstader, 2000). Hizbollah's 
Central Press Office site came under attack once again when the group posted video clips 
of Israeli ground attacks on Palestinians in Gaza. Hizbollah then increased their server 
capacity in order to ward off further attacks (Gentile, 2000a). These efforts 
                                                 
14
 The Tupac Amaru Solidarity Page hosted by UCSD is at http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/mrta.htm. The official 
homepage of the MRTA (in Europe) may be accessed at http://www.voz-rebelde.de.  The latter page is 
available in English, Spanish, Italian, Japanese, Turkish, and Serbo-Croat translations. The Tupac Amaru 
were on the United States list of FTOs until 2001 when they were removed. 
15
 Online at http://www.igc.org/igc/gateway/index.html.  
16
 For more information on the e-mail bombing and IGC's response to it see http://www.igc.apc.org/ehj/. 
Also the press release issued by Internet Freedom UK in response to the shutting of their operations by 
Scotland Yard: http://www.fitug.de/debate/9709/msg00018.html. The group's Web site is located at 
http://www.netfreedom.org.  
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notwithstanding, pro-Israeli hackers successfully hacked into the Hizbollah Web site a 
further time on 26 December. They posted pictures of the three Israeli soldiers who were 
abducted in early October and the slogan "Free Our Soldiers Now" on a screen full of 
blue and white Star of David flags (Hosein, 2001).17 In addition, a group called Hackers 
of Israel Unite allegedly crashed the Almanar TV site using one computer with a 56K 
modem, an ADSL line, and a popular tool called WinSmurf that enables one to conduct a 
mass pinging (Gentile, 2000b). 
Also in October 2000, a number of media outlets in the US and Europe were 
contacted by a group claiming that hackers had defaced a Hizbollah site. When 
journalists accessed the site they were greeted by the Israeli flag, Hebrew text and a tinny 
piano recording of Hatikva, the Israeli national anthem. This prompted several news 
organisations to report that Hizbollah’s Central Press Office site had been defaced by pro-
Israeli hackers (Hockstader 2000; Piller 2001) Only later did it become apparent that the 
site at hizbolla.org (which is no longer operational) was a fraud that had been established 
by an unidentified individual or group using an address in Lebanon (Garrison & Grand 
2001).  
According to Hizbollah's then Webmaster, Ali Ayoub, "Our counterattack is just 
to remain on the Net" (Hosein, 2001). The Palestinians and their supporters were not long 
in striking back, however. In a coordinated counterattack, the Web sites of the Israeli 
army, Foreign Ministry, prime minister and parliament, among others were hit 
(Hockstader, 2000). On a single day, 29 December 2000, 80 Israel-related sites were 
hacked and defaced by pro-Palestinian hackers. It is estimated that, in all, more than 246 
Israeli-related sites were attacked between October 2000 and 1 January 2001 as compared 
with approximately 34 Palestinian-related sites that were hit in the same period (Hosein, 
2001). The success of the Palestinian counterattack -- variously dubbed the 'e-jihad,' 
'cyber-jihad,' or 'inter-fada' -- may be explained by the way in which the pro-Palestinian 
hackers systematically worked their way through sites with dot-il domain names. 
Palestinian-related sites are generally harder to find because, although in March 2000 dot-
ps was delegated the country code Top Level Domain (ccTLD) for the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, only one such domain is currently operational (gov.ps) (See 
Cisneros, 2001),18 and not many groups have such easily identifiable URLs as Hezbollah. 
In addition, there are approximately two million Internet hookups in Israel, which is 
considerably more than any other Middle Eastern country (see Table 2). The upshot of 
this is that the Israeli's have a far greater online presence than the Palestinians and their 
supporters in the Arab world and are therefore more easily targeted. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 In October 2000, a group claiming that hackers had defaced a Hizbollah site contacted a number of media 
outlets in the United States and Europe. When journalists accessed the site the Israeli flag, Hebrew text and 
a tinny piano recording of Hatikva, the Israeli national anthem, greeted them. This prompted several news 
organizations to report that Hizbollah's Central Press Office site had been defaced by pro-Israeli hackers 
(see Hockstader, 2000; Piller, 2001). Only later did it become apparent that the site at hizbolla.org (which is 
no longer operational) was a fraud that had been established by an unidentified individual or group using an 
address in Lebanon (see Garrison and Grand 2001, 7).  
18
 The official Web site of the Palestinian National Authority at http://www.pna.gov.ps/ was accessible at 
time of writing. I have experienced difficulties accessing this site in the past. 
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(Inter)Networking and 9-11 
 
In their recent work Rand's John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini point to 
the emergence of new forms of terrorist organization attuned to the information age. They 
contend, "terrorists will continue to move from hierarchical toward information-age 
network designs. More effort will go into building arrays of transnationally internetted 
groups than into building stand alone groups" (Arquilla et al 1999, 41). This type of 
organizational structure is qualitatively different from traditional hierarchical designs. In 
 
 
Table 2 .   Internet Users in the Middle East, 2001 
Country Number of Subscribers % of Population 
Bahrain 140,200 21.36 
Iran 420,000 0.63 
Iraq 12,500 0.05 
Israel 1,940,000 17.12 
Jordan 212,000 3.99 
Kuwait 200,000 9.47 
Lebanon 300,000 8.38 
Oman 120,000 4.42 
Palestine 60,000 N/A 
Qatar 75,000 9.75 
Saudi Arabia 570,000 2.5 
Syria 60,000 0.35 
UAE 900,000 36.79 
Yemen 17,000 0.09 
Source: http://www.nua.ie     
 
the future, terrorists are likely to be organized to act in a more fully networked, 
decentralized, "all-channel" manner. Ideally, there is no single, central leadership, 
command or headquarters. Within the network as a whole there is little or no hierarchy 
and there may be multiple leaders depending upon the size of the group. In other words, 
there is no specific heart or head that can be targeted. To realize its potential, such a 
network must utilize the latest information and communications technologies. The 
Internet is becoming an integral component of such organizations, according to the Rand 
analysts (Arquilla et al 1999, 48-53; Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001). The militias or patriot 
movement in the United States are known to have adopted inter-networked forms of 
organization similar to those outlined above. While the anonymity of the Internet is seen 
as fuelling the conspiracies of the militias, for the groups themselves access to such new 
technologies is seen as a vital tool for recruitment and funding (in a similar way to 
terrorist organizations). The Internet has enabled the militias to spread their ideas 
worldwide. There are militias in Australia and Canada, and it has been suggested that the 
Far Right in Europe has adopted the idea of 'leaderless resistance' via the Internet (Mulloy 
1999, 16). Activists within the patriot movement have repeatedly urged their compatriots, 
not only to organize themselves along networked lines, however, but also to opt out of 
other more pervasive networks that are viewed as dangerously perceptible to attack: "We 
need to set up our own cashless societies, our own barter networks, and unhook from the 
grid, to become self-sufficient, away from the power company, the gas company, and the 
water company" (Mulloy 1999, 324; see also Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). At the same 
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time that the militias are unhooking from the grid, however, it is asserted that terrorist 
groups are more networked than ever before. 
The adoption of such inter-networked forms of organization by terrorist groups 
has not been sufficiently researched. However, since the events of 9-11 a clearer picture 
has begun to emerge of the way in which the Internet might be used to support such 
organizational structures. The abilities of intelligence officials to eavesdrop on e-mail and 
phone calls, was supposed to help prevent attacks such as those that occurred in New 
York and Washington from ever coming to successful fruition, but they did not. As a 
result, assumptions about the role the Internet can play in fighting terrorism are being 
revised. Investigators are now turning to Internet tools in their investigation as never 
before (Schwartz, 2001). What role has the Internet played in the investigation of the 
attacks thus far? Importantly, what can be done online to track the group depends in large 
part on what the group did online. In a briefing given in late September 2001, FBI 
Assistant Director Ronald Dick, head of the United States National Infrastructure 
Protection Center (NIPC),19 told reporters that the hijackers had used the Net, and "used it 
well." 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks federal agents issued subpoenas and 
search warrants to just about every major Internet company, including America Online, 
Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, and many smaller providers. It is known that the hijackers 
booked at least nine of their airline tickets for the four doomed flights online at least two 
to three weeks prior to the attacks. They also used the Internet to find information about 
the aerial application of pesticides. Investigators are said to have in their possession 
hundreds of e-mails linked to the terrorists in English, Arabic and Urdu. The messages 
were sent within the United States and internationally. According to the FBI, a number of 
these messages include operational details of the attacks. Some of the hijackers used e-
mail services that are largely anonymous -- Hotmail, for example -- and created multiple 
temporary accounts. A number of them are known to have used public terminals, in 
libraries and elsewhere, to gain access to the Net, whereas others used privately owned 
personal or laptop computers to do so (Cohen 2001; Fallis & Cha 2001, A24). 
In two successive briefings, senior FBI officials stated that the agency had found 
no evidence that the hijackers used electronic encryption methods to communicate on the 
Internet. This has not prevented politicians and journalists repeating lurid rumors that the 
coded orders for the attacks were secretly hidden inside pornographic Web images 
(Cohen, 2001; Lyman, 2002), or from making claims that the attacks could have been 
prevented had Western governments been given the power to prevent Internet users from 
employing encryption in their communications (Cha 2001, E01).20 Although many e-mail 
messages sent to and from key members of the hijack teams were uncovered and studied, 
none of them, according to the FBI, used encryption. Nor did they use steganography, a 
                                                 
19
 He Clinton administration spearheaded the first major US effort to upgrade computer security in 
government and business against cybercrime. President Bill Clinton issued an order in May 1998 
establishing the National Infrastructure Protection Center, a collaboration between law enforcement, 
military, and intelligence organizations to increase defenses against computer crime. The center also 
developed an information-sharing network with major industrial sectors.  
20
 In Britain, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw provoked a storm of protest by suggesting on the BBC that the 
media and civil liberties campaigners had paved the way for the terror attacks on America by advocating 
free speech and favoring publicly available encryption. 
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technique which allows an encrypted file to be hidden inside a larger file (such as a '.jpeg' 
or '.gif' image, or an '.mp3' music file). Evidence from questioning terrorists involved in 
previous attacks, both in America and on American interests abroad, and monitoring their 
messages reveals that they simply used code words to make their communications appear 
innocuous to eavesdroppers. 
Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini have also pointed to the way in which difficulties 
coping with terrorism will increase if terrorists move beyond isolated attacks towards 
new approaches that emphasize campaigns based on swarming. They point out that while 
little analytic attention has been paid to swarming, it is likely to be a key mode of conflict 
in the information age (Arquilla et al 1999, 41). In their Countering the New Terrorism, 
Arquilla et al. describe this new technique thus: 
 
Swarming occurs when the dispersed nodes of a network of small (and perhaps some large) forces 
converge on a target from multiple directions. The overall aim is the sustainable pulsing of force 
or fire. Once in motion, swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a 
target, then dissever and redisperse, immediately ready to recombine for a new pulse. In other 
words, information age attacks may come in 'swarms' rather than the more traditional 'waves' 
(Arquilla et al 1999, 53-54). 
 
This device points to the adaptable, flexible, and versatile nature of offensive networks 
with regard to opportunities and challenges. The fact that the 9-11 hijackers employed a 
technique similar to the one described above has given the Rand analysts' work a far 
higher profile than might otherwise have been expected. Far from being innovative or 
under-utilized, however, swarming has been employed by hacktivists -- including those 
acting in support of terrorist organizations -- for some time. As Dorothy Denning has 
pointed out, cases such as that involving the Euskal Herria Journal and other similar 
incidents illustrate the power of such tools. Despite the ISPs willingness to host the site, 
IGC simply could not sustain the attack and remain in business. On the other hand, such 
cases also illustrate the power of the Internet as an organ of free speech: because venues 
for publication on the Internet are so rich and diverse and dispersed throughout the world, 
it is extremely difficult for hacktivists and governments alike to banish from the Net 
content they deem offensive using swarming or any other techniques (Denning 1999, 21). 
  
 
The Internet and 9-11: The Aftermath 
 
Authorities have been keeping a watchful eye on Web sites perceived as extremist for a 
number of years. In February 1998, Dale Watson, chief of the International Terrorism 
section of the FBI, informed a United States Senate committee that major terrorist groups 
used the Internet to spread propaganda and recruit new members (Gruner and Naik, 2001; 
Liu, 2001). Previous to 9-11, however, the authorities were not entitled to interfere with 
such sites for legal reasons. Since that time, the FBI have been involved in the official 
closure of what appears to be hundreds -- if not thousands -- of sites. An Indiana ISP 
pulled several radical Internet radio shows, including IRA radio, Al Lewis Live and Our 
Americas, in late September 2001 after the FBI contacted them and advised that their 
assets could be seized for promoting terrorism. The New York-based IRA Radio was 
accused of supporting the Real IRA. The site contained an archive of weekly radio 
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programmes said to back the dissident Irish republicans (Cobain 2001). The archive of 
political interviews from the programme Al Lewis Live, hosted by iconoclastic 
actor/activist Lewis,21 drew some 15,000 hits a day. Our Americas was a Spanish-
language programme about rebels in Latin America (Kornblum, 2001; Scheeres, 2001).22 
Yahoo! has pulled dozens of sites in the Jihad Web Ring, a coalition of 55 jihad-related 
sites, while Lycos Europe established a 20-person team to monitor its Web sites for 
illegal activity and to remove terrorist-related content (Gruner and Naik, 2001; Scheeres, 
2001).23 
In August 2001, the Taliban outlawed the use of the Internet in Afghanistan, 
except at the fundamentalist group's headquarters. The Taliban, nevertheless, maintained 
a prominent home on the Internet despite United Nations sanctions, retaliatory hack 
attacks, and the vagaries of the United States bombing campaign. The unofficial Web site 
of Dharb-i-Mumin, an organization named by the United States on a list of terrorist 
groups, is still operational.24 Another site, entitled 'Taliban Online,' contained information 
including instructions on how to make financial donations, or donations of food and 
clothing, to the Afghan militia, but is no longer operational. In addition, a United States-
based Web site operated by the group was shut down in late September 2001 following a 
request from the United States Treasury Department to the group's Kansas City-based ISP 
(NIPC 2001, 1). 
One of the larger jihad-related sites that remained in operation in the wake of 9-11 
was Azzam.com. The site was run by Azzam Publications a London-based publisher. The 
Azzam site was available in more than a dozen languages and offered primers including 
'How Can I Train Myself for Jihad.' A number of Azzam's affiliates were shut down after 
people complained to the ISPs hosting the sites (at least one, following a request from the 
FBI). The British company Swift Internet, which was the technical and billing contact for 
an Azzam site, is said to have received threatening e-mails accusing it of supporting a 
terrorist Web site. Swift has since distanced itself from the site by removing its name as a 
contact on public Internet records. Meanwhile, as often as the site is shut down, it is 
replaced by a substitute/mirror site under a different URL. Said the Azzam spokesperson: 
"One cannot shut down the Internet" (Gruner and Naik, 2001). 
At the present time American officials are said to be searching the Internet for the 
reappearance of an Arabic language Web site that they believe has been used by al-Qaida. 
Statements ostensibly made by al-Qaida and Taliban members have appeared on the site 
Alneda.com.25 The site, which is registered in Singapore, appeared on Web servers in 
Malaysia and Texas in early June 2002, before American officials shut it down. The site 
is thought to have first appeared on the Net in early February 2002. It is expected to 
reappear under a numerical address in an effort to make it harder for American officials 
to track down. According to media accounts, the site contained audio and video clips of 
Osama bin Laden; pictures of al-Qaida suspects currently detained in Pakistan; a message 
claiming to be from al-Qaida spokesman Sualaiman Abu Ghaith, in which he warned of 
                                                 
21
 Formerly Grandpa on the 1960s hit TV show 'The Munsters'! 
22
 Al Lewis Live, can still be heard on Pacifica Radio. The IRA Radio site is back online since March 2002 
at http://www.iraradio.com. The other sites remain offline. 
23
 The Electronic Frontier Foundation is keeping a tally of sites that have been shut down or restricted since 
9/11. The list is available at http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Terrorism_militias/antiterrorism_chill.html.  
24
 Online at http://dharb-i-mumin.cjb.net/.  
25
 The site has also appeared at http://www.drasat.com.  
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new attacks upon the United States; and a series of articles claiming that suicide 
bombings aimed at Americans are justifiable under Islamic law (Iqbal, 2002; Kelley, 
2002). There has been media speculation that the site is being used to direct al-Qaida 
operational cells (AFP 2002). According to one report the site has carried low-level 
operational information: in February it published the names and home phone numbers of 
al-Qaida fighters captured by Pakistan following their escape from fighting in 
Afghanistan with the aim that sympathizers would contact their families and let them 
know they were alive (Eedle, 2002). Click on Alneda.com today and the following 
appears: Hacked, Tracked, and NOW Owned by the USA. The site is described as "a 
mostly unmoderated discussion board relating to current world affairs surrounding 
Islamic Jihad [sic] and the US led war on terrorism (plus other conflicts around the 
globe)." Not only does the domain name Alneda.com point to this site, but the URL 
Nukeafghanisatn.com also points to this discussion board (see also McWilliams 2002). 
 
 
New Legislative Measures 
 
In February 2001, the UK updated its Terrorism Act to classify “the use of or threat of 
action that is designed to seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic 
system” as an act of terrorism (see Di Maio 2001; Mates 2001).26 In fact, it will be up to 
police investigators to decide whether an action is to be regarded as terrorism. Online 
groups, human rights organizations, civil liberties campaigners, and others condemned 
this classification as absurd, pointing out that it placed hacktivism on a par with life-
threatening acts of public intimidation (Weisenburger 2001, 9).27 Notwithstanding, in the 
wake of the events of 9-11, US legislators followed suit. Previous to 9/11, if one 
successfully infiltrated a federal computer network, one was considered a hacker. 
However, following the passage of the USA Act,28 which authorized the granting of 
significant powers to law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute potential 
threats to national security, there is the potential for hackers to be labeled cyberterrorists 
and, if convicted, to face up to 20 years in prison (NIPC 2001; see also Middleton 2002 & 
Levin 2002, 984-985). Clearly, policymakers believe that actions taken in cyberspace are 
qualitatively different from those taken in the ‘real’ world.  
It is not the Patriot Act, however, but the massive 500-page law establishing the 
US Department of Homeland Security that has the most to say about terrorism and the 
Internet. The law establishing the new department envisions a far greater role for the 
                                                 
26
 The full text of the UK Terrorism Act 2001 is available online at 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000011.htm.  
27
 Furthermore, ISPs in the UK may be legally required to monitor some customers’ surfing habits if 
requested to do so by the police under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  
28
 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 was signed into law by US President George Bush in 
October 2001. The law gives government investigators broad powers to track wireless phone calls, listen to 
voicemail, intercept e-mail messages and monitor computer use, among others. I cannot enter into a 
discussion of the Act here due to limitations of space. However, the full text of the Act is available at 
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/lawsregs/patriot.pdf (Section 1016 pertains to critical infrastructure 
protection). See also Johnson 2001; Matthews 2001. 
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United States’ government in the securing of operating systems, hardware, and the 
Internet in the future. In November 2002, US President Bush signed the bill creating the 
new department, setting in train a process that will result in the largest reshuffle of US 
bureaucracy since 1948. At the signing ceremony, Bush said that the “department will 
gather and focus all our efforts to face the challenge of cyberterrorism” (as quoted in 
McCullagh 2002c). The Department of Homeland Security will merge five agencies that 
currently share responsibility for critical infrastructure protection in the United States: the 
FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), the Defense Department’s 
National Communications System, the Commerce Department’s Critical Infrastructure 
Office, the Department of Energy’s analysis center, and the Federal Computer Incident 
Response Center. The new law also creates a Directorate for Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection whose task it will be to analyze vulnerabilities in systems 
including the Internet, telephone networks and other critical infrastructures, and orders 
the establishment of a “comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and 
critical infrastructure of the United States” including information technology, financial 
networks, and satellites. Further, the law dictates a maximum sentence of life-
imprisonment without parole for those who deliberately transmit a program, information, 
code, or command that impairs the performance of a computer or modifies its data 
without authorization, “if the offender knowingly or recklessly causes or attempts to 
cause death.” In addition, the law allocates $500 million for research into new 
technologies, is charged with funding the creation of tools to help state and local law 
enforcement agencies thwart computer crime, and classifies certain activities as new 
computer crimes (Krebs 2002; McCullagh 2002c; Poulsen 2002).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the space of thirty years, the Internet has metamorphosed from a US Department of 
Defense command-and-control network consisting of less than one hundred computers to 
a network that criss-crosses the globe: today, the Internet is made up of tens of thousands 
of nodes (i.e. linkage points) with over 105 million hosts spanning more than 200 
countries. With a current (February 2003) estimated population of regular users of over 
605 million people, the Internet has become a near-ubiquitous presence in many world 
regions. That ubiquity is due in large part to the release in 1991 of the World Wide Web. 
In 1993 the Web consisted of a mere 130 sites, by century’s end it boasted more than one 
billion. In the Western world, in particular, the Internet has been extensively integrated 
into the economy, the military, and society as a whole. As a result, many people now 
believe that it is possible for people to die as a direct result of a cyberterrorist attack and 
that such an attack is imminent. 
On Wednesday morning, 12 September 2001, you could still visit a Web site that 
integrated three of the wonders of modern technology: the Internet, digital video, and the 
World Trade Center. The site allowed Internet users worldwide to appreciate what 
millions of tourists have delighted in since Minoru Yamasaki’s architectural wonder was 
completed in 1973: the glorious 45-mile view from the top of the WTC towers. 
According to journalists, the caption on the site still read ‘Real-Time Hudson River View 
from World Trade Center’ (O’Toole 2001). In the square above was deep black 
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nothingness. The terrorists hadn’t taken down the Net, they had taken down the towers. 
“Whereas hacktivism is real and widespread, cyberterrorism exists only in theory. 
Terrorist groups are using the Internet, but they still prefer bombs to bytes as a means of 
inciting terror,” wrote Dorothy Denning (2001) just weeks before the September attacks. 
Terrorist ‘use’ of the Internet has been largely ignored, however, in favor of the more 
headline-grabbing ‘cyberterrorism.’  
In conclusion, the bulk of the evidence to date shows that terrorist groups are 
making widespread use of the Internet, but so far they have not resorted to 
cyberterrorism, or shown the inclination to move heavily in this direction. In keeping 
with this reality, Richard Clarke, former White House special adviser for Cyberspace 
Security, has said that he prefers not to use the term 'cyberterrorism,' instead, he favors 
the term 'information security' or 'cyberspace security,' since at this stage terrorists have 
only used the Internet for propaganda, communications, and fundraising (Wynne, 2002). 
In a similar vein, Michael Vatis, former head of the US National Infrastructure Protection 
Center (NIPC), has stated that “Terrorists are already using technology for sophisticated 
communications and fund-raising activities. As yet we haven’t seen computers being 
used by these groups as weapons to any significant degree, but this will probably happen 
in the future” (Veltman 2001). According to a 2001 study, 75% of Internet users 
worldwide agree, they believe that ‘cyberterrorists’ will “soon inflict massive casualties 
on innocent lives by attacking corporate and governmental computer networks.” The 
survey, conducted in 19 major cities around the world, found that 45% of respondents 
agreed completely that “computer terrorism will be a growing problem,” and another 
35% agreed somewhat with the same statement (Poulsen 2001). The problem certainly 
can’t shrink much, hovering as it does at zero cyberterrorism incidents per year. That’s 
not to say that cyberterrorism cannot happen or will not happen, but that, contrary to 
popular perception, it has not happened yet. 
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